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Mary Ann Glendon maintains that the United States has created too
many legal rights in the last two generations.1 She argues, to an in-
creasingly receptive audience, that this multiplication of rights threat-
ens both national values and efficiency. The critique of rights can be
seen as containing both normative and positive aspects. The expan-
sion of rights-oriented discourse is said by some to impoverish polit-
ical debate by posing public issues in rigid and inflexible terms that
limit our capacity to find solutions.2 The creation of new rights is also
thought to diminish our commitment to older and perhaps more fun-
damental rights. Moreover, the shift to a rights-based politics is
marked by a shift of institutional forum away from legislatures and
into courts. Insofar as courts lack the capacity to make complex and
well-informed public policy decisions, this forum shift is likely to lead
to worse policies.
Glendon is not the first observer to comment on the American
tendency to transform political issues into questions of rights, to place
these disputes in juridical rather than political settings, and to deliber-
ate about them in a legal rather than a political discourse. Within a
half century of the adoption of the Constitution, Alexis de Tocqueville
noted the legalistic aspects of American public life,3 the extensive use
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1. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS (1994).
2. See PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW IS SUFFOCATING
AMERICA (1994).
3. The language of the law thus becomes, in some measure, a vulgar tongue; the spirit
of the law, which is produced in the schools and courts of justice, gradually penetrates
beyond their walls into the bosom of society, where it descends to the lowest classes, so
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of courts, and the ubiquity of lawyers in public disputes. As de
Tocqueville noted, "scarcely any political question arises in the United
States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question."
'4
Historian Gordon Wood similarly describes a vast growth in rights in
the post-Constitution period: "The result was paradoxical: as the pub-
lic power of the state grew in the early Republic, so too did the private
rights of individuals-with the courts mediating and balancing the
claims of each."' There seems good reason for thinking that rights
claiming was a distinctive feature early in American public life.
America's distinctive tendency to a rights-claiming politics has
been traced to different sources. Some have argued that it is charac-
teristic of America's liberal tradition that we conceive of our public
relations in terms of rights rather than in terms of improving the com-
munity or increasing the general welfare. Americans have seen them-
selves, on this account, as intrinsically endowed with rights that define
and delimit the appropriate forms of public activity and shape political
conflict and dispute. This "culturalist" view, sometimes traced to
Locke and sometimes to the Lockean circumstances of the American
colonies, might be seen, at once, to underlay America's uniquely litig-
ious culture and to explain its tendency to see political issues as legal
ones.
An alternative view, no less culturalist, would put more weight on
America's English legal inheritance and on the specific features of
common law adjudication. The common law places courts at the
center of resource allocation issues; access to courts is achieved
through claiming rights. Because the American colonial experience
was mediated by these particular legal forms, Americans oriented
themselves to public decisionmaking fora, thus making courts rather
than other bodies central social decisionmaking institutions. Both cul-
turalist theories find the origins of a rights-claiming politics in colonial
experiences, and both theories see these tendencies as deep-seated
within our shared values, if not immutable.
While the culturalist views seem descriptively accurate in some
ways, they are deficient in accounting for the differences between
American politics and politics of other nations that share a similar
cultural history with us. Why is it, for example, that Canada and
that at last the whole people contract the habits and the tastes of the judicial
magistrate.
1 ALExMs DE Tocoutvu±L, DEMOcRACY IN AMERICA 290 (1945).
4. Id.
5. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 325 (1991).
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Great Britain-both common law coutries-have evolved so differ-
ently with respect to rights creation and enforcement? Why is it that
policy debates in those countries do not typically center on questions
of rights and liberties but focus as often on welfare, community, or
equity? Cultural or historical accounts seem ill-fitted to answer such
questions. If, for example, American political culture is different from
its Canadian counterpart, these theories do not explain how or why
this is so.
For that reason we seek an alternative, structuralist account that
roots rights creation in institutional features of American politics and
conceives of cultural variables as endogenous with respect to political
structure. Such an account locates the development of American le-
galism in specific institutional or structural innovations, such as the
Constitution and other federalist institutions, rather than simply in
shared cultural values or common historical experiences. In doing so,
a structuralist theory promises to explain why American legal/consti-
tutional culture developed so differently than those cultures in Britain
and Canada. The aim of this Article, therefore, is to lay out institu-
tional reasons for our nation's rights fixation. Drawing upon rational
choice theories of political institutions,6 we argue that separation of
powers, federalism, and judicial review foster a lawmaking regime that
produces multiple opportunities for rights creation and fewer oppor-
tunities for rights negation. The result is the multiplication of rights
over time-the phenomenon Glendon bemoans.
PREFACE: AN INSTITUTIONAL UNDERSTANDING
OF RIGHTS
Though there is a good deal of disagreement as to how to define a
"right," we need not enter deeply into this thicket. We may think of a
right as a certain kind of normative claim to resources or to protection
from others. Rights critics see two significant aspects of rights crea-
tion, normative and institutional. From a normative viewpoint, the
creation of a right limits the kinds of reasons that may enter into re-
source allocation decisions that touch that right, and this prohibition
diminishes the quality of these decisions. Where rights are involved,
public decisions cannot turn only on issues of what would maximize
6. See JAMEs M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT- LOGI-
CAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMoCRAcY (1962); WILLIAM H. RiKER & PETER C.
ORDESHOoK, AN INTRODUCION TO Posmw POurnCAL THEORY (1973); Symposium, Positive
Political Theory and Public Law, 80 GEO. LJ. 457 (1992).
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social welfare, for example, but must, with some exceptions, respect
rights claims.7 For this reason, except in special conditions, rights-
based politics will tend to be rigid and inefficient.8 Moreover, rights
stultify normative discourse by alienating the individual from the
community and diminishing the community's sense of shared
responsibility.
Institutionally, the creation of a right shifts the locus of decisions
to legal officials and away from elected politicians. This means not
only that different people, with different capabilities and interests, are
making decisions, but also that certain kinds of interests are likely to
be respected and others ignored. From the institutional perspective,
the creation of a right expands the domain of legality, even if other
rights are extinguished. It remains to judges and courts to arbitrate
and harmonize the body of rights claims and find some rights actiona-
ble and others not.
It is this "forum shifting" feature of rights creation that we con-
sider in this Article. We argue that the structure of American consti-
tutionalism produces powerful and long-lived tendencies to rights
creation and, therefore, to a legalistic politics in which courts play a
central role in public decisions. This tendency is rooted, we think, in
some characteristic asymmetries embedded in the U.S. Constitution,
asymmetries that systematically work to create new rights.
Consider three institutional structures. First, in exercising the
"judicial Power" allotted, to them in Article III, federal courts are in
the business of deciding what the law is and how some kinds of law
trump others. Judicial review flows from the propositions that the
Constitution trumps statutes and that the Supreme Court is the main
interpreter of the Constitution (implicit in Article III, Section 2 and
Article VI).9 Hence, the Court has the power to create statute-trump-
ing "rights." Federal judges' life tenure and protection against salary
cuts assure that their preferences will not be perfectly aligned with
those of officials in the elected branches all of the time.
7. See generally RONALD DwoRKYN, TAKING RiGHTs SEIuousLY (1977) (advancing one
version of this view).
8. The exceptions cover what may be called the neoclassical cases where rights-exercising
does not generate externalities and where rights may be exchanged in markets.
9. See Tim FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803). We treat judicial review as an exogenous variable in this Article, but at the
founding this was not necessarily so. See Robert Lowry Clinton, Game Theory, Legal History,
and the Origins of Judicial Review: A Revisionist Analysis ofMarbury v. Madison, 38 AM. J. PoL
Sci. 285 (1994).
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Second, separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers is
assured by Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution. A consequence
of separation of powers is that lawmaking in the United States is inter-
active and sequential. Sequential action by differently situated institu-
tions assures that each has some degree of trumping power over the
others. Combined with judicial review, this interactive process places
a premium on rights creation. On the one hand, the Court will often
create rights the political process will not recognize; the political
branches have imperfect trumping power when the Court creates con-
stitutional rights. On the other hand, when the Court refuses to create
a constitutional right, the political branches may do so through stat-
utes which the Court is bound to implement more or less faithfully.
As the Founders anticipated in Article I and the Tenth Amend-
ment, federalism permits the states to act as a third level of rights
creation, as discussed in Hamilton's Federalist No. 28. In Federalist
No. 51, James Madison posited that the federal structure assures a
"double security" for individual rights. In the United States, most
government action is at the state and local, rather than the national,
level. If the Supreme Court and Congress both refuse to create rights,
state courts and legislatures have the option to do so and can often be
expected to exercise it.10
The foregoing structures assure many entry points for rights crea-
tion. Surely, however, rights get weeded out as well as created, but
Glendon and others seem correct in perceiving that many more rights
are being created than are being abolished or narrowed. Rights crea-
tion dominates rights abolition, at least in part for structural reasons.1'
In the final part of this Article, we suggest what we shall call a "virtual
logroll" between the Court and the political process to explain our
system's tendency to create more rights than it weeds out. That is, the
10. "State constitutions ... are a font of individual liberties, their protections often ex-
tending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law." William J.
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HAgv. L. REv. 489,
491 (1977).
11. Traditional historical reasons do not completely persuade us. The main reason is that it
is much harder to take away a legal "entitlement" from people in our society than it is to deny
them a desired entitlement. This partly explains the force of stare decisis, due process, rules
against retroactive regulation, the Takings Clause, and the like. It is not completely satisfying,
however, because entitlements are being changed whenever new rights are created, as well as
when old rights are being weeded out. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 127-38 (William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); WESL.EY NEWCOMB HoHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL
LEGAL CONCEPTIONS As APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (Walter
Wheeler Cook ed., 1923).
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Court will create the rights it cares about the most while deferring to
Congress' and the states' most cherished rights, and Congress and the
states will do the same. That this virtual logroil is reinforced by stable
and revered institutional arrangements suggests that its results will not
be easily ameliorated.
I. THE ASYMMETRY OF THE COURT'S DISCRETION IN
CREATING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
RULES: THE AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION CASES
Our political system requires lawmaking by the interaction of
three political branches: Congress enacts statutes, the executive
branch implements them, and the courts both interpret statutes and
review them as applied. This interaction can be modeled as a sequen-
tial political game. 2 The game is played across a linear space of possi-
ble statutory policies, in which a position to the right represents
relatively conservative policy preferences and a position to the left
represents relatively liberal policy preferences. Suppose Congress en-
acts a statute that reflects its preferences, but disagreements about the
statute arise. Persons and institutions then turn for interpretation to
the courts and ultimately to the Supreme Court, which has a prefer-
ence of its own, J.'3 Although the Court can substitute its interpreta-
tion for that of the agency, the current Congress, L, can in turn
override the Court's interpretation, subject to veto by the president,
P, which Congress can override by a two-thirds vote in each chamber,
1. In equilibrium, each player in the game will try to impose its policy
preferences upon the statute, to the extent that its policy result is not
overridden by a subsequent player.
In this sequential game of policy formation, the Supreme Court
can greatly affect policy through dynamic interpretation of statutes. It
can do so under three different conditions. First, the Court can imme-
diately interpret a statute contrary to legislative preferences, L, where
the Court's preferences, J, are aligned in the same direction as those
of the president, P. In this circumstance, the president's veto power
12. This idea is developed more elaborately in William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn,
The Article , Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992).
13. The Court's preference may be of a different kind than legislative preferences. The
Court's preferences may be informed by its responsibility for the rule of law-hence judicial
preference for plain meanings over linguistic creativity. On some issues, the Court will have
strong preferences about the substantive policy. In some part of those cases, the Court's policy
preferences will be more important than its rule of law preferences.
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ought to protect the Court up to the legislature's "veto median," 1.
Second, the Court can interpret statutes dynamically over time when
the legislature's preferences change from L to L'. (Throughout this
Article, we shall use the prime (') or double prime (") symbol to sig-
nify later points in time.) Third, the Court can interpret statutes dy-
namically when legislative preferences are inconsistent with the
Court's interpretation of the Constitution, X. (Throughout this Arti-
cle, we shall use upper-case notation, X, to denote the equilibrium
location of constitutional policy and lower-case notation, x, to denote
the equilibrium location of statutory policy.)
The classic example of dynamic interpretation is United Steel-
workers v. Weber,14 where the Court interpreted Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to permit a "quota" program designed to remedy
low numbers of African-American employees. As the dissenting
opinion strenuously argued, this interpretation (x' = J') was at odds
with the legislative expectations of the 1964 Congress (x = L), which
emphasized the ways in which the statute would create color blindness
in the workplace. The dissenting opinion's characterization of the





The Weber decision, 1979, from the dissent's perspective: Statutory policy shifts from
x = L tox' = P
From the dissent's point of view, the Court was unwilling to create a
"right" for white employees disadvantaged by workplace affirmative
action, because it disagreed with that right and because the 1979 Con-
gress was unwilling to override the Court to establish that right on its
own.
A more sophisticated understanding of Weber must take account
of the Court's apparently inconsistent approach in Regents of the Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke.15 In that case, the Court struck down a
quota program run by a state medical school. The judgment of the
Court was delivered by Justice Lewis Powell, whose opinion created a
new civil right for white applicants not to be disadvantaged by open
14. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
15. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
1995]
HeinOnline  -- 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1551 1994-1995
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1545
"quota" programs.' 6 Yet this is the very right that the Court rejected
the next year in Weber. What explains the difference in the two cases
which were decided by the very same Justices? We hypothesize that
the Court's median voter-Potter Stewart 7-was swayed by the dif-
ferent context in which plaintiffs were asking the Court to create
rights. In the statutory context of Weber, the Court was willing to sac-
rifice its preference for creating a right so as to avoid an override by
Congress-which in 1979 supported a liberal civil rights agenda. In
the constitutional context of Bakke, the Court's desire to create a new
right was not so easily overcome, for an override in this case would
require a constitutional amendment, usually obtained by a two-thirds
vote in Congress, V, and ratification by three quarters of the states, s'.
Figure la maps the Court's freedom.
FIGURE 1A
X' x
L' J' I' L
S'
The Bakke decision, 1978: Constitutional policy set at X' = J', and not at X' = L'
Specifically, the Court could have set constitutional policy anywhere
to the left of I' without danger of an override. Given that freedom, it
is reasonable to suppose that the Court set policy at the point favored
by its median Justice, Lewis Powell.
If the Court revealed its raw preferences as to affirmative action
in Bakke, we must rethink the configuration of preferences in Weber.




L' J' I' L
SI
Statutory (x') and constitutional (X') rights against affirmative action, 1979
This diagram vividly displays the Court's greater freedom to create
rights in constitutional as opposed to statutory cases, based upon
16. Justice Powell's opinion approved programs that considered race a "plus" for diversity
reasons. Hence, his approach was not colorblind; rather, it was a compromise. See JOHN CAL-
ViN JEFmREs, JR., Jus-ICE LEwis POWELL, JR. 1483-87 (1994).
17. Justice Stewart "switched" sides from the Powell position in Bakke to the Brennan
position in Weber.
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nothing more than the different procedures required for overriding
the Court.
The foregoing example suggests other interesting hypotheses.
One is that the Court has an incentive to constitutionalize issues about
which it feels intensely but not to constitutionalize issues about which
it is uncertain. This makes the Court's choice between statutory
analysis and constitutional analysis itself a signal of the Court's prefer-
ences to the rest of the political system.'" The Court in 1978-79 was
deeply ambivalent about affirmative action, and Bakke reflected that
ambivalence. Five Justices ruled against the university's quota system,
but only Justice Powell reached the constitutional issue; the other four
Justices relied on statutory grounds.
Ronald Reagan ran for president on platforms hostile to affirma-
tive action, and for three election cycles that platform won substantial
presidential victories. To the surprise of no one, the Court grew more
conservative as President Reagan added Justices to the Court (Sandra
Day O'Connor in 1982, William Rehnquist elevated to Chief Justice
and Antonin Scalia in 1986, and Anthony Kennedy in 1987). That
conservatism pressed the Court to the right in affirmative action cases
and made clear that Bakke stood for a constitutional right. Expanding
upon the Bakke constitutional right, the Court struck down municipal
affirmative action programs in several cases during that period.' 9
During this same period, Congress was hostile to the Court-cre-
ated right.20 That hostility bothered the Court very little in constitu-
tional cases, for the Court in 1989 expanded Bakke to overturn a
minority "set-aside" program in Croson v. City of Richmond.2' The
hostility bothered the Court a great deal, however, in statutory cases.
18. Pablo Spiller and Matthew Spitzer propose an alternative explanation for the Court's
choosing to undertake statutory rather than constitutional rulings. In their theory, constitutional
judgments do not permit the Court as much control over the outcome of the case as do statutory
ones. Pablo T. Spiller & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines, 8 J.L. ECON. &
ORGAMZATION 8 (1992). Their focus is, however, on policing agency discretion, whereas ours is
on creating or refusing to create legal rights that must be respected by Congress. In our setting,
the Court may have somewhat greater control in constitutional as opposed to statutory
interpretations.
19. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Firefighters Local No. 1784 v.
Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
20. Evidence of this hostility was displayed at hearings held by Senator Hatch in 1981 to
override Weber and that part of Bakke that allowed some affirmative action. Even though the
Republicans then controlled the presidency, the Senate, and a working majority in the House, no
one showed up at Hatch's hearings. This suggested that no political support existed for overrid-
ing Weber.
21. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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Thus the Court in 1986 reaffirmed Weber's interpretation of Title VII
in Johnson v. Transportation Agency.' Justice William Brennan's ma-
jority opinion in Johnson refused to consider the constitutional issue
(even though the employer was a government agency), arguing that it
had not been properly presented to the Court. Justice Rehnquist (dis-
senting), as well as the two Reagan appointees then sitting (Justice
O'Connor concurring and Justice Scalia dissenting) insisted that the
constitutional issue was properly before the Court, a signal that they
not only favored a more conservative approach (X' rather than x' in
Figure 1b), but also that they felt strongly about the issue. They were
able to express that intensity two years later in Croson, when Justice
Powell's replacement by Justice Kennedy deprived Justice Brennan of
his Johnson majority. Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion for the
Court which revealed very conservative preferences about govern-
mental set-aside programs, even when adopted for assertedly "be-
nign" remedial purposes. Croson and other decisions handed down
by the Court in the 1988 Term reflected the Court's increasing disap-
proval of affirmative action to help African-Americans. Congress was
powerless to do anything about Croson but overrode the Court's
other decisions with a statute that instructed the Court to leave Weber
and Johnson alone.' 3
II. THE ASYMMETRY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE
BY CONGRESS (THE VOTING RIGHTS CASES)
AND THE STATES (THE SCHOOL
FUNDING CASES)
The phenomenon explored in Part I, where an activist Court can
create constitutional rights that the political system would not, was
just as characteristic of the Warren Court as it was of the Burger
Court. The Warren Court in Fortson v. Dorsey 2 4 suggested in dictum
that an electoral scheme that had either the effect or the intent to
minimize the voting strength of minority racial groups would violate
the Fifteenth Amendment. The Burger Court in White v. Regesterl-
applied this standard to invalidate a multi-member district plan which
22. 480 U.S. 616, 627 (1987).
23. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 116. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). A coalition of civil rights groups worked on an override bill in
1989, and one was passed in 1990 but successfully vetoed by President Bush. 136 CoNO. REc.
S16,589 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990). Early discussions considered efforts to override Croson, but
that idea was abandoned in light of the dynamics discussed in this Article.
24. 379 U.S. 998 (1965).
25. 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1972).
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effectively excluded African-Americans and Mexican-Americans from
election to local offices. This result was a more intrusive regulation of
state voting practices than Congress had been willing to make in the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 or in its reenactment in 1970. Figure 2 indi-
cates that Fortson's stringent standard was somewhat to the left of





The Fortson decision, 1965: The Court sets constitutional policy, X, to the left of
Congress' preferences, L, but to the right of Congress' veto median, 1, or the three-
quarters state median, s
The lesson of Fortson is similar to the lesson we draw from Bakke: The
Court has substantial discretion in creating new constitutional rights,
because political supermajorities are needed to override the Court's
policy choices.
The Court's next move in the vote dilution cases differed from its
corresponding move in the affirmative action cases, however.
Whereas the late Burger Court in the affirmative action cases ex-
panded upon the constitutional right created in Bakke, it retreated
from that right in the vote dilution cases. In Mobile v. Bolden,2 6 the
Court declined to strike down as unconstitutional an at-large election
scheme to the Mobile city commission which had never elected an
African-American member in its seventy-year history. Justice Stew-
art's plurality opinion reasoned that even though the "effect" of the
scheme might be discriminatory, discriminatory "intent" had not been
established.2 7 This holding essentially imported into the voting rights
area a constitutional doctrine developed by the Burger Court in the
areas of employment, housing discrimination, and schools. 28
The Burger Court moved to the right in the voting rights cases for
some of the same reasons it was moving to the right in affirmative
action cases. At the same time, Congress was moving to the left be-
cause the Voting Rights Act and the increased participation of racial
minorities in the electoral system penalized conservative preferences
26. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
27. Id at 70.
28. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (employment); Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (housing); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,
413 U.S. 189 (1973) (schools).
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in this area. In the affirmative action cases, Congress was unable to
override the Court's rights-creating decisions, because the Court was
protected by the supermajority requirements of Article V. In the vot-
ing rights cases, however, Congress was in a position to override the
Court's rights-denying decisions. To create a right that the Court has
denied, all Congress ordinarily must do is pass a statute. After Mo-
bile, the Court was confronted with a firestorm of protest. Some of
the protest was a reaction to the confusion occasioned by the lack of a
majority opinion in the case, but most of the protest revealed to the
Court that it had misjudged the political landscape on voting rights
issues. Republicans as well as Democrats criticized the decision as an
illegitimate retreat from the nation's commitment to equal voting
opportunities.
The Court was not insensitive to the adverse reaction. In 1982, it
decided Rogers v. Lodge,29 a case that presented nearly the same facts
as Mobile. While not formally retreating from Mobile, the Court held
that the facts in Rogers supported a finding of discriminatory "intent."
Also in 1982, the district court in another Mobile, Alabama vote dilu-
tion case made a finding of discriminatory "intent," which the
Supreme Court later affirmed.30 In effect, the Court acted to shift the
judicially imposed position to the left towards the Fortson position but
without moving all the way back to that position by overruling Mobile.
As it turned out, these moves were not enough to forestall congres-
sional action, and in the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act
Congress adopted the disparate impact test suggested in Fortson and
White. The Court went along with this standard in its interpretation of
these amendments in Thornburg v. Gingles.3'
Figure 2a diagrams the shift in policy from Fortson-Regester, X, to
Mobile, X', to Rogers, X", to the 1982 Act as interpreted in Gingles (a
return to X, but as a statutory policy, x").
29. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
30. Brown v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 542 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Ala. 1982), affid, 706 F.2d
1103 (11th Cir.), aff'd mem., 464 U.S. 1005 (1983).
31. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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Shift in policy, from Mobile (X' = J) to Rogers (X") to Gingles (x'- 1")
Note how "mobile" policy becomes when the Court refuses to create a
constitutional right that Congress favors. Note also an evolution as to
how we characterize X. When X was instantiated by the Court in
Fortson, it was a constitutional right that could only be trumped by
supermajorities in Congress and among the states. When x" was in-
stantiated by Congress, it was merely a statutory right which could be
overridden by a subsequent Congress or by judicial review. Yet x"
retains some constitutional background, X, since Congress intended to
codify a prior constitutional regime.
The two asymmetries we have explored reveal double opportuni-
ties to create rights, either at the insistence of the Court, if the polit-
ical system is reluctant, or of Congress, if the Court refuses. We now
introduce a third asymmetry and a third opportunity to create rights:
If both the Court and Congress refuse to create a right against a state
or local government, the state supreme court or the state legislature
can create the right. This asymmetry is, theoretically, most important
of all because the states have no formal power to resist rights creation
by Congress or the Court32 but are sometimes inclined to be even
more rights-protective than Congress or the Court. Consider the most
recent and far-reaching example of this phenomenon.
At the same time that the Burger Court was rejecting disparate
impact as its standard for protecting civil rights of racial minorities,
the Court decided San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez.3 3 A sharply divided Court rejected an equal protection chal-
lenge to the grossly unequal distribution of public educational
resources in the Texas school system. The Court refused to create a
right to equal education by poor people. Consistent with its emerging
stance in the race discrimination cases, the Court was uninterested in
the disparate racial (African-American) and ethnic (Latino) impact of
the funding disparities. For some of the same reasons that it refused
32. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (the Supremacy Clause prevents the states from contra-
vening federal rights, whether under the Constitution or under a congressional statute).
33. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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to recognize constitutional rights in Mobile, the Court refused to rec-
ognize rights in Rodriguez. The same liberal scholars and civil rights
groups criticized both decisions. Based on such criticisms, the Court's
refusal to recognize fights was trumped after each case.
The affected states were disinclined to impose the right denied in
Mobile, but Congress was willing to do so. Congress was unwilling to
impose the right denied in Rodriguez, but some of the states were
willing to do so. The school district that was the focus of litigation in
Rodriguez continued as the focus of similar litigation in Texas state
courts pursuant to the Texas Constitution.34 And the same groups
that lost in the U.S. Supreme Court won in the Texas Supreme
Court,35 as have similar litigants in one fifth of the states.3 6 Figure 2b




The Rodriguez decision, 1973, and the Edgewood decision, 1989: Policy shifts
from X = J to X' = J, but for Texas only
Figure 2b would be somewhat different for each state whose supreme
court has adopted a more liberal rights regime than that of Rodriguez.
III. WHY THE ASYMMETRIES WORK TO MULTIPLY
RIGHTS AND NOT TO CURTAIL THEM: THE FREE
EXERCISE CASES
Parts I and II reveal the many entry points for rights creation in
the American political system. What the prior analysis does not re-
veal is why the entry points are not evenly matched with exit points.
While Congress reinstated rights curtailed in the Burger Court's vot-
ing rights decisions, it did not do so when the Burger and Rehnquist
34. The Texas Constitution provides that "it shall be the duty of the Legislature ... to
establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of
public free schools." TEx. CONsr. art. VII, § 1.
35. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). The actual imple-
mentation of this right has been exceedingly messy.
36. Namely, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Kentucky, Montana, New Jersey, Washing-
ton, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. at 398. Similar litigation has lost in Arizona, Colorado,
Georgia, Idaho, Maryland, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and South Caro-
lina. See id. at 398 n.6.
1558
HeinOnline  -- 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1558 1994-1995
MULTIPLYING RIGHTS
Courts curtailed civil rights in school desegregation decisions, result-
ing in a net erosion of rights. Nor is it inevitable that the congres-
sional override of Mobile might not itself be trumped by a Court
intensely opposed to the resulting race-conscious districting. In Shaw
v. Reno, 7 a closely divided Court created a right for white voters
against race-conscious redistricting, especially those yielding "un-
couth" or "bizarre" shaped districts. Shaw suggests that the practice
of devising majority-minority districts (the principal remedy available
under the Gingles test) may sometimes violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. Shaw indicates that the Supreme Court's hostility to
race-based affirmative action might affect its willingness to allow Con-
gress to have its way in voting rights. This reminds us that if the Court
wants to raise the stakes it might mount constitutional challenges to
the Voting Rights Act or its implementation by the states. In that
event, the Court's greater freedom in constitutional cases would allow
it to abolish rights as well as create them. Are the instances of rights
curtailment generalizable? Or are they overwhelmed by the instances
of rights creation?
There are structural reasons to believe that the asymmetries we
have described will systematically work to expand rather than to cur-
tail rights in the medium term and perhaps in the long term as well.
Federalism provides a starting point for understanding this phenome-
non. Most rights claims are asserted against state and local govern-
ments. The supremacy of national law forbids states from trumping
rights created at the national level, but permits them to create rights
of their own. At the same time the national separation of powers per-
mits either the Supreme Court or Congress to impose new rights on
the states. This triple opportunity for rights creation is, at most, offset
by a double opportunity for rights curtailment. Moreover, there is
reason to believe that the Court and Congress will usually not veto
one another's imposition of new rights.
Consider the Supreme Court's incentives. On the one hand, the
Supreme Court is constantly tempted to create rights, because that is
the most obvious way the Court exercises power.38 In a period where
there are no political or economic shocks, the Justices have plenty of
37. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). The Court has elaborated on Shaw in Miller v. Johnson, 115 S.
Ct. 2475 (1995).
38. The Court has no effective legislative power because it cannot tax and plan. Nor does
the Court have effective executive authority. Its power derives from adjudication, and its polit-
ical importance derives from its authority to interpret statutes and the Constitution. If there
were no justiciable limits on federal or state legislatures, the Court would be inconsequential.
1995] 1559
HeinOnline  -- 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1559 1994-1995
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1545
opportunities to expand their power to serve whatever goals suit them
(whether rule of law or policy). They do this by trumping statutes
with rights. On the other hand, every exercise of judicial trumping
power is fraught with danger. Political institutions, especially Con-
gress, can hurt the Court if sufficiently riled.39 In the longer term,
congressional support for important Supreme Court initiatives is criti-
cally important. One way around this dilemma, even if not inevitable,
is what we call a "virtual logroll" between the Court and Congress.40
Earlier notions of logrolling rest on the idea of an explicit ex-
change of political support within a majoritarian legislature. The out-
comes supported by such exchanges are always unstable in the sense
that a majority can be found that would prefer another outcome. A
virtual logroll is an implicit exchange among parties located within a
set of institutional locations.4' Under a virtual logroll, the Court as-
serts a rights-creating power for those issues it cares the most about,
while deferring to the most intense rights-creating preferences of Con-
gress, The sequential -structure of interaction among federal institu-
tions makes it difficult to construct coalitions that can overturn the
resulting outcome.
While we emphasize the structural biases towards rights creation,
we do not deny the existence of psychological supports. Possession is
not only nine tenths of the law, but at least sixth tenths of a thing's
value. We tend to value more highly a good we possess than an
equivalent good we do not possess.4' In the same vein, as de
Tocqueville noted long ago, we tend to value more highly a right we
have possessed for a while than a right we are just now asking for.
Since John Marshall's Chief Justiceship, the Court has been politically consequential. The cur-
rent Justices are not likely to relinquish this role.
39. Congress, in particular, can respond to Supreme Court assaults on its prerogatives by
severe but rarely invoked retaliations such as impeachment and jurisdiction stripping, and by
more indirect but frequently suggested measures such as screening new Justices, harassing the
Court on judicial management issues, and jawboning.
40. This phenomenon is developed in William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The
Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994).
41. Because of the institutional nexus within which exchanges take place, such exchanges
need not be vulnerable to the underlying instability that can plague the attempt to engage in an
explicit logroll. See John Ferbjohn, Logrolling in an Institutional Context: A Case Study of Food
Stamp Legislation, in CONGRESS AND POuCY CHANGE 223 (Gerald Wright et al. eds., 1986).
42. This is sometimes called the "endowment effect." The idea is captured in the famous
offer-ask phenomenon: I am willing to offer you less money for Good "A" that you possess than
I would ask from you to relinquish Good "A" that I possess. The feature of possession, which is
contingent as a legal matter, is valuable in its own right. ,
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This phenomenon reinforces whatever tendencies the Court and Con-
gress might have for respecting one another's different rights cre-
ations. Consider the following example.
For almost 200 years, the First Amendment's protection of the
"free exercise of religion" merely protected people from direct gov-
ernment suppression of their faiths and did not protect against state
action that indirectly burdened religious freedom. 43 The Warren
Court in Sherbert v. Verner44 held that states cannot enforce generally
applicable Saturday work requirements against Saturday Sabbatarians
without showing a compelling state interest. For the next thirty years
the Court applied Sherbert sporadically.45 The Rehnquist Court over-
ruled Sherbert in Employment Division v. Smith,4 6 which abandoned
strict scrutiny of general state laws causing indirect harm to religious
exercise. An unusual combination of religious as well as liberal
groups denounced Smith as a deprivation of established free exercise
rights. There was immediate pressure for the pre-Smith right to be
protected notwithstanding the Supreme Court's opinion. Some state
courts, for example, evidenced a willingness to give greater protection
to the free exercise right than the Supreme Court was willing to do.47
The more important response was at the national level, however.
Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
("RFRA")48 to override Smith. Section 1 of the statute provides that
"[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicabil-
ity," unless the application furthers a compelling state interest. With a
few exceptions, the statute claims to codify the prior free exercise ju-
risprudence.49 Stated another way, RFRA effectively supersedes the
Smith constitutional right with a Sherbert statutory right. An out-
standing issue is whether Congress has the constitutional power to ac-
complish this supersession. Although doctrine in this area is muddy,
43. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitu-
tional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEo. WASH. L. Rnv. 915
(1992).
44. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on
the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933 (1989).
45. In one case it was dramatically applied. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(invalidating state insistence that Amish families send their children to public schools).
46. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
47. See Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An
Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 275.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. 1993).
49. See Ira C. Lupu, Of Tune and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 56 MoNT. L. REV. 171 (1995).
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our game theoretic model suggests reasons why the Court would want
to acquiesce in Congress' rights expansion. The Court may narrow
RFRA by interpreting it stingily or to avoid constitution-based pre-
sumptions, but it will be disinclined to override a congressional enact-
ment as decisive as RFRA.







Shift in policy, from Sherbert (X = J) to Smith (X' = J') to RFRA (x' = L')
The story of the free exercise cases (Figure 3) resembles the story of
the voting rights cases (Figure 2a). In both instances, the Warren
Court created a new constitutional right, disregarding precedent and
innovating mightily; a more conservative Court overruled the rights-
creating decisions and was in turn overridden by Congress seeking to
reinstate the Warren Court rules.
CONCLUSION
No doubt, Americans have become accustomed to conceiving of
their relationship to each other and to the state in terms of rights.
This disposition symbolizes much that is distinctive about our political
life and culture, and, many would argue, it has served the nation well.
By placing their faith in the individual rather than the state and insist-
ing on a robust space for autonomous choice, Americans have limited
the danger of tyranny-or at least tyranny by public officials. The
tendency to create rights-the attempt to solve social problems by
delegating decisionmaking power to individuals rather than broaden-
ing the discretion of public policymakers-has been, on this view,
both a characteristic and successful political strategy of American
public life.
While we admit that there are cultural and historical roots of
rights orientation, we have argued that this tendency cannot be ade-
quately accounted for without considering our nation's distinctive in-
stitutional structure. The institutional structure embodied in the
Constitution makes the rights-creation solution for social problems a
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natural one for American politicians. The division of powers embod-
ied in the Constitution promotes a long-term tendency to create
rights. Courts and legislatures are given a great temptation to protect
their most cherished preferences by enshrining them as rights cre-
ations. Once constitutional rights are found, they are given a great
deal of protection against statutory override. Moreover, judicial long-
evity and stability promoting legal doctrines conspire to make rights
unlikely to be reversed. This is not to say that reversals do not hap-
pen. The rejection of Lochner, Plessy, and Dred Scott stand as re-
minders both of the possibility and of the extraordinary nature of such
action.
The tendency to rights creation is not necessarily biased in con-
servative or liberal directions. While the development of privacy
rights is currently favored by liberals, expansion of the effects of the
Takings Clause is popular with many conservatives. In any case, we
think that the temptation to turn political disputes into matters of
legal rights has an important and enduring impact both on American
political culture and on the content of our public policy. By trans-
forming political argument into legal dispute about rights claims, some
kinds of political justifications are privileged and others discounted.
Programs that can be comfortably situated in a rights discourse are
easier to defend than those whose effects cannot be so explained. In-
deed, it seems to us that recent attempts to remove the entitlement
status of various welfare programs constitute a recognition of the im-
portance of defending public programs in terms of rights.
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